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Lay Summary

After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Russian peoples were spread across the many
newly independent states. In recent years, these Russian communities have been at the forefront
of international attention as the largely Russian regions of eastern Ukraine have been engaged in
a separatist rebellion. These breakaway factions of Russians and pro-Russian fighters have been
influenced, supported, and even directed by the Russian government itself. Ukraine’s Russian
minority shares many characteristics with the Russian community of another former Soviet state:
Kazakhstan. The Russians in the Kazakh Republic, as with Ukraine, are largely concentrated
along the border with Russia and constitute a population in the millions. In this paper I compare
these two communities and attempt to explain why one population has been directed by the
Russian government into separatist, ethnically-driven conflict and the other has not.
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Abstract
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many ethnic groups found themselves
suddenly as a diaspora across the various republics. Most notable among these would be the
Russians who radiated out from the Russian SFSR into the periphery states. In two states in
particular, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, was there simultaneously an overall large community of
these dispersed Russians and in which that community formed a substantial share of the host
state’s population. In 2014, in the wake of a pro-European regime change in Ukraine, a civil war
erupted as Moscow directed pro-Russian separatists to seek independence.
This paper compares two compatriot communities and the states’ respect relationships
with Russia. While much has been written on the Russian diaspora generally or in the Ukrainian
conflict, very little scholarship has directly compared these two groups. Of all the research
referenced in this essay, only one article focuses on comparing these two states and specifically
separatism. This work was done by Marlene Laruelle, a renowned Eurasian affairs specialist. Her
work focused largely on internal factors and what I interpret as constructivist reasoning. By
contrast, my research attempts to expand to external factors, deemphasizing traditional drivers of
separatism and instead focusing on factors that would motivate a kin-state to engage their near
abroad diaspora into separatism or support an organic separatist movement.
The key factors my research focuses on are the relative value of each state’s geography to
Russia’s geopolitical strategy and the relationships built by their respective heads of state, as
well as the largely internal factor of language policy as representative of the host state’s
treatment of Russian culture as a whole. I conclude are that these characteristics are at least
partially determinant of Russia’s policy towards its compatriots in a given state and might serve
as factors to gauge a kin state’s incentive for kin group mobilization more broadly.
3

Introduction
How do kin states utilize their bordering diasporas as an extension of their foreign
policy? What factors motivate their choice to influence their ethnic communities in one state
over another? What specific grievances can an ethnic minority have that would facilitate kin state
interference? How have all these played out in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)? Questions such
as these are becoming of increasing relevance in the world of foreign affairs as studies have
placed greater influence on the role of ethnicity in international security after the Cold War’s
conclusion (King and Melvin 1999, 111). This development is largely the result of the collapse
of major multi-ethnic communist states, specifically the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and Yugoslavia with each presenting unique case studies in ethnic identity as a result of
their diverse constituent states. Particularly, as discussed in this paper, the diaspora of Russians
in the former Soviet Union has directly contributed to the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine and
overall Eurasian security.
Diasporas in the social sciences refer to “transnational social organization relating both to
the country of origin and the country of exile. (McClaurin 2008)” This is a relatively new
definition, however, as for centuries this term referred exclusively to the exile of the Jewish
people from Babylon and their subsequent extensive migrations (Sheffer 2003, 9). This
definition was the norm up until the late twentieth century when dictionaries began to provide
multiple applications of the term. As such, the word used in the plural to refer to multiple similar
instances is also a recent phenomenon. Diasporas might be spread globally, pulled in many
directions, such as the Jewish people, or more regional such as the Uyghurs in Central Asia.
Diaspora politics are defined chiefly by the relations between kin states, kin groups, and
host states. Kin groups are a broadly defined term referring to interconnected peoples that share a
4

commonality of blood lineage, culture, or other markers of heritage, essentially intertwined with
ideas of ethnicity (Sheffer n.d.). A kin-state1, by contrast, is a nearby territory where the kingroup chiefly originates from or has a close cultural affinity for. The final key actor in this
dynamic, the host state2, is the territory in which the kin group is residing in outside of their
homeland. When referring to kin-groups in proximity to the kin-state, particularly bordering it,
the term “near abroad” will often be applied. Near abroad in relation to Russia typically refers to
the former republics of the USSR and has colonial sentiments attached in its usage by Russia.
By contrast, those groups transplanted far away from their ancestral or cultural homelands will
instead be labeled as the “far abroad” communities.
Diasporas represent an intriguing phenomenon in foreign affairs as they illustrate
concepts of identity transcending national borders. These groups may often times be utilized as
extensions of their homeland’s foreign policy within their host states and serve as conduits to a
kin state agenda in their local politics (Koslowski 2005, 2).
The relations between kin states and their communities abroad are of significant concern
to host states and third parties as a matter of international security. Ethnic conflict is the most
common cause of civil wars in the contemporary world (Walter and Denny 2014, 199). In 2000,
a World Bank study referred to diasporas as having a distinctive ability to induce perpetual
conflict as grievances are passed down generationally and become intertwined with local ethnic
identity (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, 2). The inherent fear is that the local minority will have a
natural loyalty to the kin state and will rebel against the host nation with little incitement (Sheffer
n.d.). To put it more bluntly, the underlying assumption is that foreign adversarial states will

1
2

Also referred to interchangeably as “homelands” for purposes of this paper.
Also referred to as a “hostlands” (Sheffer n.d.).
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employ a mix of agents in their ethnic cohort abroad, both directly and indirectly, to disrupt the
stability, security, and integrity of the host state.
Host states are often dominated by a titular majority group who believe that to concede
to their minority groups would pose an existential threat to their country’s survival as an
independent state (Chinn and Kaiser 1996, 5). Their claims to the whole territory of their state
will subliminally posit that the minority group’s presence is ruining the homogeneity of the
nation and represents a potential breakage in integrity when these kin groups inevitably try to
reunify with their bordering homeland. In the modern era of nation-building, particularly in postcommunist states, it can be hard to reconcile inherent minorities with the desire to build up an
identity around the titular culture.
Russian Compatriots and the Former Soviet Union
The Soviet Union’s collapse is a particularly useful case study on the role of diasporas in
foreign policy. With the suddenness of the state’s demise, there was a near-instantaneous
creation of diaspora populations as a result of the large-scale internal migrations of the USSR.
The most obvious and notable of these transplanted groups is the dominant Russian ethnicity that
radiated out from their titular SFSR into border republics either by force or incentivized by
prospects of better livelihood through land and agriculture (Kolstoe 1995, 51-55). Some of these
communities had been present since Tsar’s era, expanding with internal Soviet migration. These
individuals were poorly equipped to deal with this sudden change in citizenship and found
themselves unexpectedly reshaping their national identity (Saunders 2005, 173). The now
foreign-subjected communities are considered to be Russia’s near abroad diaspora that resides
adjacent to the federation’s borders. These populations were disjointed from their kin-state so
suddenly that Vladimir Putin would refer to the collapse of the USSR and its subsequent
6

repercussions for the Russian diaspora as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”
(NBC News 2005). When referring to Russians abroad, the Russian state has taken to using the
term “compatriot” for their ethnic brethren, particularly those of the former USSR (Ziegler 2006,
104). Often times, this term is applied more liberally to any Russian speakers or those considered
properly Russified, implying an intrinsic loyalty to the motherland by those with significant
Russian heritage (Ziegler 2006, 107). Now, decades later, Russia is actively engaging its
compatriots in Ukraine to assert its security agenda in Europe, while leaving its similarly large
ethnic community in states such as Kazakhstan largely alone.
This paper will primarily focus on the Russian populations in Ukraine and Kazakhstan,
and how they play into the Kremlin’s relationship with the respective host states. This essay
offers overview of Moscow’s policies towards the given country as they relate to compatriots,
followed by an explanation of possible factors motivating these behaviors. This will be done
through an examination of each state’s strategic geography, its treatment of the Russian
population, and the personal relationship between the heads of state. The goal is to gain a better
contextualized understanding of the current foreign policy of Russia and its implications for the
wider study of near-abroad diaspora communities.
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Russia’s Relationship with Ukraine and Its Compatriots

Figure 1: Concentrations of Russian native speakers in Ukraine. This indicates the concentration of ethnic Russians proportional
to the rest of the state, but ethnic population does not match number of native speakers (Krasznohon 2014).

Russia and Ukraine’s history is permanently intertwined as both claim a lineage to the
historic state of the Kyivan Rus3, an entity centered on what is today Ukraine’s capital. While
this would be the purported origin of both nations, its role as the center of power of the Rus4
would be usurped by the Grand Principality of Moscow and the more eastern region we call
European Russia would become the dominant regional power. Ukraine, whose borders would
shift many times through its history, would be generally defined as the western edge of this new
Slavic power. In fact, the name “Ukraine” derives from the Russia word for borderland, krai,
meaning “edge” or “frontier”. As the peoples of this region developed a distinctive identity,

3

In this instance, Rus refers to a specific loose political entity rather than the ethnic marker mentioned later.
Historic term referring to the three principle Western Slavic peoples as a collective. These are the Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belarusians.
4
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however, where the greater Russian identity would end, and the Ukrainian identity begin was
unclear. While both peoples generally regard each other as culturally connected, the Russians
more often see their western neighbors as a subsect of their larger identity in an almost parental
fashion, as evidenced by language used by the current Russian administration (Putin 2021). Their
national identity, of course, was of little relevance politically when for centuries they were
unified under a single state. With the sudden collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation has
been forced to redefine its relationship with a now independent Ukraine that has begun to move
away from its sphere of influence. One of the key aspects of this new relationship is the role of
the large ethnic Russian and broader Russophone population in Ukraine. Self-identified Russians
compose roughly 17% (8.3 million) of Ukraine’s population and, as with other post-Soviet states,
are located largely along the Russian border (Laruelle 2018, 66-67).
While not directly refuting the sovereignty of Ukraine, Russia has persistently argued that
the state’s existence in its current form is at best by the grace of the Federation, or at worst an
unjust mistake, with Putin specifically referring to its creation as a blunder by the Bolsheviks
during the Russian Revolution (Kessler 2022). In statements on the issue of Russian-Ukraine
tensions, Putin has insisted on a “one people” ideology (Kuzio 2020). Furthermore, when it
comes to their compatriots specifically, the Russian state has repeatedly asserted a right as the
dominant power and ethnic homeland to intervene in the interest of its diaspora (Laruelle 2018,
67). Despite this perceived responsibility by Moscow, however, Russians and Ukrainians don’t
appear to want unification. According to Pew Research, polls taken in February, shortly before
the Russian annexation of Crimea, only 12% of Ukrainians and 16% of Russians desire a united
people (Bell 2014). Nonetheless, the Kremlin has continued to push the message of bonded and
inseparable identity (Putin 2021).
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This belief has been the Kremlin’s standard justification for repeated acts violating
Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2014, the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was ousted as a
result of the pro-European Euromaidan revolution. The new regime, initially headed by acting
president Oleksandr Valentynovych Turchynov, immediately began to seek greater integration
with the West after the Kremlin-aligned Yanukovych’s escape to Russia. This was the boldest
Ukraine had made in moving out of the Russian sphere of influence, prompting a swift response
from Putin. At the time, Ukraine was split between ambitions of joining the European Union and
Russian pressure to revert eastward to join the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) instead
(Lapenko 2014). Ukraine was forced to choose between Europe and Russia, and in light of
Russia’s meddling in their trade policies opted to more definitively reject the latter.
Immediately, unidentified armed forces appeared on the Crimean Peninsula, a historically
Russian and strategically important region of southern Ukraine. At the time of these moves,
ethnic Russians composed roughly 60% of the peninsula’s population, according to the most
recent Ukrainian data (Pifer 2020). This number could have been as high as 68% according to
the census conducted by Russia immediately following the crisis, a number that might reflect
Russian bias (Ukrainian Community of Crimea Public Regional Organization 2014). It soon
became apparent that these unmarked soldiers were Russian forces, and by March they had
gained complete control of the area (Sullivan 2022). Once consolidation of control was
complete, the Crimean government held a referendum on joining the Russian Federation as its
latest republic5. The outcome of this vote is largely considered fabricated as it showed a 97%

5

In the Russian Federation, a republic is a form of federal subject (sub-national division) that is granted certain
degrees of autonomy not offered to the more common divisions, such as oblasts or krais. This is typically because
it is the home of a major ethnic minority (i.e. Tatarstan) or is of some other historic significance (i.e. Crimea or
Karelia).
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“yes” to annexation despite about 40% of the population being Ukrainian, Tatar, and other
minorities (Pifer 2020). On March 22nd, Moscow welcomed the peninsula into Russia as the
Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol6. This was the first significant landgrab in
Europe since WWII, marking an absolute disregard for international law and any notion of
sovereignty.
Immediately following this, a civil war broke out in Eastern Ukraine. Pro-Russian rebels
declared two oblasts7 to be independent states: the Luhansk8 People’s Republic and the Donetsk
People’s Republic. Collectively these territories are referred to as the Donbas9 and form the
largest Russian-speaking region of Ukraine outside of Crimea. It soon became evident however
that this wasn’t merely a traditional civil war, but a manufactured fight provoked by Moscow
(Jensen 2017, 2). With an influx of Russian-made weapons and the reported presence of Russian
military advisors, the war can thus be characterized as a form of proxy war directed by a great
power through its kingroup against a neighboring state. Russia has even gone so far as to give
some legitimacy to these insurgencies through representing their interests in international
dialogues and helping manage them on a formal level through Kremlin committees addressing
the “affected peoples” of the fighting (Jensen 2017, 7).
In summary, Russia has used its kin group as justification for annexation of territory and
a has made patronizing claim to represent the compatriots of these areas. Furthermore, Moscow
has directed its diaspora to commit great acts of violence so as to allow for a military extension
of the Putin agenda without the formal direction of the Russian Federation. This approach stands

6

A Federal City is a title only afforded to two other metropolitan areas: Moscow and St. Petersburg, further
highlighting the significance and important status of the annexed territories.
7
An oblast is the primary form of administrative division in both Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
8
Also spelled as “Lugansk”
9
Also spelled “Donbass”, and stems from Slavic abbreviations for the Donets Basin region.

11

in contrast to Russia’s relationship with Kazakhstan, a country that like Ukraine hosts a large
Russian diaspora.
Russia’s Relationship with Kazakhstan and its Compatriots

Figure 2: Distribution of Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan (Arntz n.d.)

Kazakhstan’s compatriot population is very similar to Ukraine’s in both scope and
geography. Approximately 21% of the population, totaling around 3.5 million people, is
ethnically Russian (Laruelle 2018). Similar to Ukraine, the population is largely confined to the
regions bordering its kin-state with the bulk of the Russian community straddling the northern
areas. Kazakhstan’s history with Russia does not stem as far back as Ukraine’s as the territory
was not a part of the ancient Rus lands. However, the Kazakh-inhabited regions had been under
the Russian sphere of influence since the early 19th century and was formally incorporated into
the Russian state in the mid-1800s (Oliphant 2013).
By contrast to the forceful breaches of sovereignty displayed in the west, Russia’s
military presence in Kazakhstan has been a positive force from the perspective of Nur-Sultan10.

10

Current capital of Kazakhstan; formerly known as Astana and renamed for President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
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In early 2022, at the same time that Russia was ramping up its military aggression towards
Ukraine, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev actively sought out assistance
from Russian troops as part of a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) deployment
into their territory to quell civil unrest in Almaty (Pikulicka-Wilczewska 2022). Kazakhstan has
even been a very willing partner in Russia-led IGOs such as the Commonwealth of Independent
States and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), both of which are post-soviet attempts at
maintaining integration of the former republics. This is largely attributable to the close ties of
their two most prominent leaders: Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vladimir Putin. These two
strongmen spent the bulk of their time in office concurrent with each other and built lasting
financial bonds that have kept both their states and regimes intertwined (Hess 2020).
The relations between the two states are far from balanced, however. As with many of the
post-Soviet states, Russia regularly treats Kazakhstan as a manufactured state (Laruelle 2018,
65). As a result of this, the sovereignty of the Kazakh Republic in the eyes of Vladimir Putin and
his regime is in doubt, with the Russian president going so far as to declare in 2014 that it never
had statehood (Lillis 2015). Similar to Ukraine, a Kazakh state as we know it today was not
conceived prior to the Soviet era as it was largely inhabited by nomadic, unsettled Turkic groups.
The Russians in Kazakhstan have long been a point of friction as Kazakhstan insists on its
territorial sovereignty in contrast to Moscow’s portrayal of the northern territories as a “gift”
from Russia (Shlapentakh 2016). Kazakhstan insists on a broader “Eurasian” identity that
encompasses both groups at the national and international level, seeking to harmoniously
integrate the respective peoples while maintaining autonomy in foreign relations seeking a multivectored approach that allows them to engage multiple great powers. Meanwhile Russians have
sought distinction and believe a Eurasian identity is reliant on a unified foreign policy centered
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on a shared vision of the post-Soviet sphere. The idea of a Donbas-like conflict in Kazakhstan
isn’t just a third-party concern espoused by Western observers with a great increase of internal
discussions being had in Kazakh media following Crimea (Laruelle 2018, 74). So then, with so
many Russians in a contiguous region of a perceived satellite state, why then does Kazakhstan
not incur the same irredentist aggression as Ukraine? There are a few key factors to consider,
beginning with how does key geography play into the positions of these states?
Reason #1: Russian Security Strategy
A simple principle of military strategy is that some territory has more intrinsic strategic
value than others (Department of the Army 2017, 2:3). This is a fundamental concept that is
drilled in defense policies and military doctrine across the world. When looking at the inherent
value of one territory over another, factors to consider include terrain, resources, infrastructure,
and position of the enemy. Traditionally, this is thought of at a smaller unit-level. However,
recent developments in Russia’s foreign policy, namely the annexation of Crimea, have shown
the importance of analyzing the relative value of certain tracts of territory compared to others at
the larger national and strategic levels (Gaudio 2017). It is that last attribute I intend to focus on
here as I examine the positions of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and by extension their compatriots,
relative to threats (perceived or real) to the Russian Federation. What makes Ukraine explicitly
more important than Kazakhstan in terms of national defense?
Historical Context of Russian Defense Philosophy
Russia has been described as a union of ethnically diverse lands that all radiate from the
titular ethnic core centered on Moscow (Fleming 1931). Among its various cultural spheres are
horsemen of the Far Eastern Steppe, ancient Caucus cultures, and a vast array of isolated
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Siberian identities. Russia is a collage of identities, all under the reign of the central ethnic
community. The further from the state’s political and cultural core, the less important and
relevant (Kotyk 1998). This has led to a doctrine of buffer states that push perceived threats
further away from the country’s center.
The Eurasian landscape has provided the Rus with few natural borders save for the
Caucasus Mountains that wall the narrow underbelly of the Russian core from the Islamic World.
The saving grace of Russia is the sheer size of their territory and its climate. A clear lesson has
been learned through the course of past campaigns such as the French or Nazis: size can
outmatch competency (Gompert, Binnendijk and Lin 2014). If Russia has a long enough buffer
between itself and its adversaries, it could have a crutch to support its national defense. Simply
put, with such vast land, there is far more opportunity to wear down an enemy logistically and
allow for the elements to force a retreat. If an invader was resolved enough to reach the inner
Rus realm, particularly the capital, they would be severely resource depleted and demoralized,
therefore much easier to uproot. As such, when evaluating the relative importance of another
state in relation to Russia, we need to think simply in terms of their effectiveness as a buffer state
given what they serve as a buffer to.
The Roles of Ukraine and Kazakhstan
As the name implies, Ukraine represents the historic western edges between Russia and
the rest of Europe. In the era of European great-power warfare, Ukraine served as the frontier of
defense for Russia. Today, that belief still holds as Russia becomes increasingly isolated in
Europe thanks in large part to the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Explicitly or not, NATO is undoubtedly poised with the intent of containing and
discouraging Russian ambitions post-communism. Founded to unite the capitalist West against
15

the Soviet Union, it failed to fade away as a relic of a bygone era with the fall of the USSR.
Many Russians believed it would cease expansion after the end of the Cold War due to a lack of
purpose and its continued growth is seen as a broken promise by the West (Ruhle 2015).
During most of the Cold War, Russia had achieved its greatest extent of influence
geographically. The Soviet Union, vast as its territory was, benefited from being further shielded
by a number of allied communist states (Yakobson 1949, 191). These countries fell under
Russian influence, if not outright control, after the Second World and collectively these states
formed what the “Iron Curtain”, a bulwark of nations stretching from East Germany to the
USSR’s border. Should NATO have chosen to attack, they would have to advance through large
swaths of Eastern Europe before reaching Soviet soil. Thus, the Russian goal of pushing the
border of its dominion far from its titular core was achieved in its largest form.
The end of the Cold War would witness a democratization of all the satellite states and
the fracturing of the USSR itself into constituent republics. The Russian people found themselves
suddenly without the wall of defense that framed their western border and less territory than
they had seen for centuries. Nonetheless, the rational assumption of course was that the western
alliances would unravel for lack of justification and Russia would be free to reengage in the
international system. This was seemingly confirmed in early negotiations between Gorbachev
and Western leaders when a number of hypothetical scenarios for post-Soviet Europe were
discussed (Sarotte 2014). The US insists, however, that none of these actually became solid
agreements and remained the speculative ideas of an early disunified Western front.
However, the unanticipated expansion of NATO would come to a head with the inclusion
of the Baltic states, thereby putting NATO quite literally at Russia’s doorstep. This only left two
countries to stand between the motherland and the West: Belarus and Ukraine. Sharing a
16

significantly larger border than the Baltic states or even Belarus with Russia, for Ukraine to shift
towards the West represents a deadly blow to the Russian strategy of utilizing satellite border
states to insulate itself. With less than a few hundred miles between the Ukrainian border and
Moscow, the “breadbasket of Europe” is almost certainly too close to striking range of the heart
of Russia for Putin’s comfort. As such, keeping Ukraine away from the west is a chief priority
for Russia’s long-term defense strategy. This fear wasn’t ill-founded either, given the United
States’ aggressive push for Ukraine’s admission at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, only to be talked
down by other member-states (Grossouvre and de Gourdon 2008). With the election of a proEuropean administration and the backlash against Russia at the conclusion of Euromaidan, the
obvious concern for the Kremlin was Ukraine’s rapid ascension into NATO and therefore
motivated the conflict generated by Moscow.
Kazakhstan, however, represents a very different role in Russia’s view of geographic
defense. In some respects, Kazakhstan is an extremely important state on account of its location.
It straddles a large portion of the historic silk road trade routes and forms an extensive buffer
between European Russia and the People’s Republic of China. Its international train routes also
help save immense time and resources by connecting many of Russia’s southern urban centers.
On the other hand, when considering its importance for defense, particularly relative to other
former republics, it depreciates rapidly compared to its European peers on account of its position
relative to potential adversaries.
Aside from the Russian Federation itself, Kazakhstan only borders a single significant
political or military power: China. This is of little interest to the Kremlin for security purposes
for a number of reasons. First, China and Russia share a special strategic partnership. As the two
greatest political powers outside the western sphere, their respective leaderships acknowledge the
17

value of support one another to help counterbalance the United States. Neither state has a
particular affinity for the other, but a mutual disdain for the unipolar world that has been their
reality since the 1990s. This relationship has begun to formalize under multilateral organizations
such the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which Kazakhstan is also a member
(Kirisci and Le Corre 2018). Furthermore, Russia shares a vast stretch of border with China east
of Kazakhstan. While the Turkic region might make influence in Russia an inconvenience, the
PRC still has plenty of access to Russia as a whole, thereby negating Kazakhstan’s use as a
barrier to the Sinosphere11. Finally, Kazakhstan borders China’s most sparsely populated region.
Adjacent to the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, Kazakhstan essentially presides over a vast
border region of desert and mountains. In short, China poses little political threat, and
Kazakhstan fails to be of much value in negating it regardless.
Turning south, the greatest threat next greatest perceived threat to Russia after NATO is
the Islamic world. Despite having historically many Muslim-majority ethnicities within its
borders, Russia’s history with Islam has often been violent. Famously in the 1970s and 80s,
Russia would clash with the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. These Afghan insurgents would later
take their experiences in this conflict, along with caches of weapons gained throughout the war,
and form a number of extremist organizations. Most notably, the Soviet-Afghan War would
contribute to the rise of Al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization vehemently at odds with Russia.
Despite a great threat perceived in the radical facets of the Islamic World, Russia can be
presumed to have substantially less concern over its geography relative to these unorthodox
factions. As Islamic terror reaches beyond its homelands and has occurred as far away as the US,

11

“Sinosphere” is a term used to refer to China’s sphere of influence, or the East Asian cultural sphere more
broadly.
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to think of Muslim extremism in conventional geographic terms is not as practical. Furthermore,
Kazakhstan itself is insulated by its fellow Central Asian states from these threats, thus providing
an even greater degree of security for Moscow. This isn’t to say that physical distance from the
homeland of these groups isn’t advantageous to Russia, merely that it doesn’t work as effectively
as territory does against conventional threats.
By comparing and contrasting Ukraine and Kazakhstan, we can see the inherent value of
the former in the current era of geopolitics as opposed to its Central Asian counterpart. At the
present, Ukraine is caught between an expanding West and a resurgent neighbor. Its historic role
as a metaphorical speedbump could be perceived as more vital now with the expanded NATO
than in the Cold War era. If, somehow, Russia faced a growing threat originating from its Asian
borders, Kazakhstan might be placed in a similar position. By its current circumstances,
however, we can likely presume that Russians in Kazakhstan are of less strategic interest to
Moscow as their territories would have substantially less impact on Russian national defense. If
Russia were to instigate conflict in Kazakhstan amongst its compatriots, it would serve little
realist12 focus save for expending some irredentist fervor.

Reason #2: Status of Russian Language and Culture
In explaining ethnic conflict, a common root cause is a perceived separation between the
minority and the greater society along cultural lines (Byman 1998). In the modern era, much
attention has been given to state-building around titular groups and asserting a new identity

12

Realism is a major school of thought in international relations that essentially expresses a belief that states
inherently behave to increase their position or promote self-interest.

19

rather than building up a more inclusive view of citizenship (Gachechiladze 1997). With Russian
culture being so dominant in the wider Soviet world, the newly independent republics were
forced to either reconcile this influence or attempt to uproot it. For the Russian minorities, this
could potentially be a critical factor in their sense of belonging or affinity for the young state as
changes to the status quo might instill a sense of foreignness in a place in which they have
resided at for generations. As such, I seek to analyze the various ways Russian culture, primarily
represented by language, has been treated by Ukraine and Kazakhstan in attempt to further
explain the disparity in experiences of their respective compatriot populations.
Role of Language
Language can often be the greatest marker of an ethnic identity. The means by which
individuals communicate, language is instrumental in a person’s everyday life. To have a
language relegated to just a person’s home creates a sense of distance between themselves and
the greater society, with perhaps the connotations associated with the language informing a sense
of socio-political status (Nino-Mercia and Rothman 2008, 4). This degree of separation can
contribute to, as Ruben Rumbaut phrased it, a “self-image” among the afflicted minorities
(Rumbaut 1994, 754). As such, the treatment of Russian directly ties to the natural integration of
the Russian people into the titular state in which their community resides.
Russian has been a dominant language of Eurasia for generations as a result of extensive
attempts at Russification by the USSR and is the lingua franca of the FSU (Kraeva and
Guermanova 2020). In the age of the USSR, it was considered foundational to Soviet identity
and was believed to “cement the unity” of their collective culture (Solchanyk 1982, 25). The
tongue’s development actually coincides with the development of the Kievan Rus and the
historic foundations of the Rus people.
20

Language plays a key role in the concept of Russkiy Mir (Russian World), an ideology
espoused by the Kremlin that seeks to unify the Russian cultural sphere (German Council on
Foreign Relations 2016). This idea of Russian identity is intended to be disconnected from
ethnicity, but instead focused on a vaguely defined concept of “Russianness” based on language,
culture, and affinity. By broadening the scope of who qualifies as Russian beyond a simple
ethnic marker, it also widens the communities that Russia can claim as its compatriots and
therefore represent. Its rhetoric of promoting and protecting Russian culture abroad plays a key
role in modern foreign policy as Russia asserts that its interference in neighboring countries is a
protective measure on behalf of its Russian compatriots.
Russian Language in Ukraine and Kazakhstan
Russians often afford their language special status and recognition as the language of
education or arts in the FSU (Aref'ev 2018). As a result of the role the language held in the
Soviet Union, the connotation is that the language should naturally take preeminence over the
perceived more plebian vernacular used by other ethnicities of the former USSR. The phrasing
used to describe its perceived elevated standing is reflected in publications from Moscow’s
Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Aref'ev 2018).
Ukraine has been a multilingual country for most of its history, even prior to its
organization as a defined territory (Bever 2011, 1). During the Soviet period, virtually everyone
in the state could speak Russian fluently and it was regularly used in an official capacity. In the
breakup the USSR, however, Ukrainian became prioritized over any other tongues as a key part
of nation building. Official policies began to limit the use of Russian in public life. The
documenting of Russian’s fall from prominence in the Ukrainian educational system and daily
life is severely dramatized in Russian governmental writings which imply a predatory effort by
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Kiev to eliminate Russian identity (Aref'ev 2018). This has been a major point of contention
among Russia’s compatriots in Ukraine, particularly in the eastern reaches. While the more
western-settled Russians have been largely content sending their children to Ukrainian-language
schools, those in Crimea and the Donbas overwhelmingly strive to retain their linguistic
autonomy and maintain Russian-speaking schooling as the norm (Kulyk 2019).
The Russian language has been a major point of political tension as well, will the
compatriots believing pro-Russian administrations could perhaps return Russian to equal footing
with the titular language (Bever 2011). However, even the adamantly pro-Putin Viktor
Yanukovych refrained from reintroducing Russian language into official usage, leaving many
Russian minorities disappointed just prior to Euromaidan and the subsequent crisis in the
Donbas. This tie between language and politics is reflected in election results, with the proRussian Yanukovych’s support coming overwhelmingly from the Russified east of the country
(Astrov 2019). With the political conditions laid by linguistic divisions and a perceived
degradation of their language by government policy, Russians and much of the Russified
Ukrainian population can reasonably feel a sectarian plight.
In contrast to Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s linguistic makeup was marked by a complete
dominance of Russian in urban centers, regardless of ethnicity. Larger cities in the state are much
more diverse and have higher concentrations of ethnic Russians. As such, the Kazakh language
was functionally reserved to the non-Russian rural communities at the outset of the new Republic
and the centers of commerce, politics, and culture were largely Russophone (Dave 2003). For
this reason, many Kazakhs were unable to functionally read and write in their own titular
language after the breakup of the USSR. This loss of native language was to such an extent that
Kazakh lingual expert Abduali Qaidarov had put the estimates for language loss as high as 40%
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among ethnic Kazakhs at the collapse of the USSR (Luong 2018). With such a high rate of
ignorance of the titular language, Russian served less as a cross-national language and more as a
mother tongue to many ethnic natives of the state. This linguistic situation was further enshrined
in the state’s constitution which dubbed Russian as “co-official” to Kazakh and of equal right of
usage in official functions (Constitution of Kazakhstan 2021, 5). As a result of Kazakhstan’s
generational reliance on Russian, it could not be abandoned readily even in areas where the
titular ethnicity held a majority. With only one in three citizens able to write the native language,
there was little to suggest that Russian would lose its position as the language of education
(Fierman 2006). The Kazakh language is growing quickly, however, and attempts at nationbuilding around the titular language have been very successful, with a reported 66% fluency in
recent years (Smagulova 2020) . Nonetheless, Russian is still used in everyday life in both
Russian and Kazakh communities with both languages sharing representation in public space.
The key contrast in the treatment of Russian between these two states is that Ukrainian
grew in conjunction to Russian as a competitor, while the Kazakh language’s importance was in
part subverted by Russian in public life. In Ukraine we see a nation split linguistically even if
largely bilingual, while in Kazakhstan the nation is largely united with Russian as the common
tongue and Kazakh’s role working from a deficit as new policies encouraging its usage must
compensate for years of reliance on Russian. For these reasons, we can theorize that Russians do
not feel as adversarial regarding language in Kazakhstan compared to Ukraine, particularly as a
political issue. This helps avoid a stigma associated with their native speakers that would
potentially harm their relationship with the host state. With greater cultural integration, they are
less likely to engage in ethnically-motivated civil conflict, and therefore might be less
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susceptible to aggressive machinations by Moscow against their hostlands as had been the case
in Ukraine.

Reason #3: The Personal Agency and History of the Heads of States
A key part of foreign relations is the less tangible exchanges between key leaders. When
discussing Russian relations in the post-Soviet era, the topic largely revolves around the
intentions of a single man: Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. Having held power since the turn of
the century, Putin represented a stable force in the region for decades as the perpetual head of the
Russian Federation (Sakwa 2019, 11). His leadership has gone unbroken save for a brief gap
from 2008 to 2012 when he abided by a constitutional mandate to step down. Even during that
time however, the presidency was held by Dmitry Medvedev who was more liberal than his
predecessor, but nonetheless kept the seat warm for Putin’s inevitable return the next election
cycle (Sakwa 2019, 14). This continuance of leadership has allowed Putin to cultivate lasting
relationships with those who also share a longevity in office and a cordial embrace of the
Kremlin.
Similarly, Kazakhstan also shared a long-standing executive: Nursultan Nazarbayev
(1990-2019). The son of an agrarian family of the mountains, Nazarbayev had risen to political
affluence in the Soviet era as a driven communist (Biography and Career of N.A. Nazarbayev
n.d.). At the collapse of the USSR, as the leader of the Kazakh SSR, he kept the Republic as a
legal constituency of the Soviet Union longer than any other state. Upon his ascension to leading
a sovereign state, Nazarbayev sought good diplomatic relations with all corners of the globe,
including the West. However, he remained firmly attached to Russia by keeping an integrated
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energy supply system and Kremlin-approved national defense polices (Rousseau 2011). Under
his regime, any significant political opposition was suppressed under threat of incarceration or
even death, with multiple major figures dying under murky and bloody circumstances. In this
regard, he is very similar to Putin. The new tsar is also speculated to have been behind the
assassinations and attempted assassinations of a great many adversaries, including the recent
notable case of Alexei Navalny of which great evidence hints at Kremlin involvement (Maire
2021). This indicates similar shared values as authoritarian, somewhat violent leaders, furthering
aligning their worldview.
Thanks to Nazarbayev’s longevity in office and his cordial relations with Putin, the two
men were able to establish a lasting partnership to deeply integrate their countries. The longer
this persisted, the deeper the ties became with Nazarbayev’s family even getting connected to
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy company (Hess 2020). Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan
has readily followed Russia in the CTSO, Shanghai Pact, and the EAEU, all of which are
Russian-led initiatives. This wasn’t merely a capitulation to Russia, either, as Nazarbayev
himself proposed a Eurasian economic and political union decades prior to the EAEU’s creation
(Lapenko 2014).Under consistent leadership, Putin has not needed to question the reliability of
his neighbor to remain in the Russian sphere of influence to the extent he has with most other
former Soviet republics. When Nazarbayev did eventually decide to step down, there was even
belief that his chosen successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, was approved by Putin before being
announced (Isaacs 2020). Due to his nature as being handpicked and the continued presence of
Nazarbayev leading the Security Council, the Tokayev regime can be seen as a continuation of
the relationship built between his predecessor and Putin. The strength of this connection was
even tested in 2022 when Tokayev called on Putin to utilize the CSTO to quell unrest in
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Kazakhstan, openly welcoming Russian troops to help reinforce his own rule. We can thus
suggest that Russia takes this as a sign of a reasonably reliable personal ally and will help
alleviate anxieties the Kremlin might have had with the shift in power. Putin’s willingness to
have Russian troops quickly depart from Kazakh soil, despite the quick escalation of irredentist
rhetoric in foreign policy, demonstrates Putin’s lack of intent to engage or exploit the
compatriots of Kazakhstan on account of his contentment with the Tokayev government.
Ukraine has not had such consistent leadership, having had five presidents in the span of
Putin’s leadership. Many would argue that this is signaling a healthier democracy than that of
many other former Soviet states and shows successful transitions of power. With the exception
of the Euromaidan protests, Ukraine’s changes in political leadership neither disrupted state
stability nor incited significant criticism of their electoral system. The drawback to this revolving
door of leaders, as with all states with functioning term limits (constitutional or otherwise), is the
inability to establish long-term personal connections in foreign policy. Putin has had to interact
with not only five different presidents, but five different political parties as well. The political
ideologies that have led Ukraine have varied drastically in their feelings towards Russia, or
conversely, the West (Odarchenko 2020). At the beginning of Putin’s term, Ukraine was led by
its longest serving president, Leonid Kuchma, an independent politician known for using
questionably (and sometimes outright illegal) means to structure the young state’s economy.
Kuchma sought a healthy trade relationship with the EU, but largely recognized the Russian
sphere of influence and spent much of his term trying to rebuild a relationship with Moscow in
the post-Soviet world. By contrast, his immediate successor, Viktor Yushchenko was the leader
of a right-wing, possibly nativist “Our Ukraine” party. This political tent sought a Ukrainian
identity distinct from Russia and diplomatic freedom of maneuver beyond Eurasia. In a complete
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reversal of these efforts, in 2010, the Ukrainian people elected Viktor Yanukovych on a
decidedly Pro-Russian platform in response to Yushchenko’s poor handling of the economy.
With boosted executive powers granted by the judiciary, Yanukovych, a most pro-Kremlin
disciple of Kuchma, began to strengthen ties eastward at the expense of the relations blooming
with the EU (Piper 2019). Yanukovych was much like his predecessor in strengthening the
powers of the presidency. While perhaps he didn’t make Ukraine as authoritarian as
Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan, this does indicate a strongman personality that is more akin to Putin
and his allies.
Putin was extremely dissatisfied under Yushchenko having perceived the Ukrainian
executive as having not been a reliable partner in Putin’s regional agenda (Kuzio 2012). With
very little regard or respect for Ukrainian sovereignty, President Putin cares little for who leads
the state so long as they toe the line for the Kremlin. As a result, he was very satisfied with the
election of Yanukovych. While not impressed by the new president, Putin believed he could be
relied upon to extend Russian regency in Ukraine. This proposed fidelity was further supported
by Yanukovych’s background as Governor of Donetsk, a largely Russophone region of the
country and one of the two oblasts to later secede in the Donbas Crisis. As such Putin could
reasonably expect to build a close partnership with what he saw as a natural ally for years to
come. Yanukovych may not have had the persona of Nazarbayev or Belarus’ Lukashenko, but
still shared values more amenable to the Kremlin. This comfortable situation, of course, would
come to a sudden end partly on account of Putin’s own agenda. In late 2013, Yanukovych would
halt a trade deal with the EU, seen as lucrative and desirable by most Ukrainians, presumably to
maintain Ukraine’s position in the Russian sphere of influence (Pifer, Ukraine: Six Years After
the Maiden 2020). This, combined with his strongman authoritarianism, resulted in massive
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series of demonstrations that would ultimately end in bloodied chaos in Kyiv. With the bulk of
the Ukrainian state balking at the idea of a Kremlin-aligned leader holding them back from
European integration, Yanukovych was forced to flee to Moscow while his homeland elected a
pro-European regime.
The sudden shift in tone towards Moscow startled Putin and he was left very uncertain as
to the future of his relationship with Ukraine (Charap 2019).With his ardent supporter hiding in
Russia, Putin was forced to consider the worst-case scenarios of a new administration coming off
a tide of pro-Europeanism. This would ultimately play a heavy part in his motivations to seize
the Crimean Peninsula in an attempt to secure Russian resources, namely military and maritime,
from potential Ukrainian acquisition. Seeing the executive no longer supporting his agenda, and
quite possibly in active opposition to it, Putin opted to utilize the Russophone regions of Ukraine
to exert his foreign policy in the state. This was done through an annexation of the peninsula
under the pretense of protecting the largely Russian population there and support of pro-Russian
rebels in the east of the country, while simultaneously ensuring their Navy’s continued access to
Crimean port facilities. This ties back to the concept of the Russian World and Moscow’s selfpurported patronage of its compatriot communities.
By comparing the leadership of the two contrasting states, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, we
can venture to see how personal relationships factor in Russia’s foreign policy. In the case of
Ukraine, a revolving door of presidents negated any attempts by President Putin to establish
lasting partnerships and the sudden switch in political leanings towards the West (NATO and
EU) in Kyiv directly motivated the Kremlin’s breach of the state’s sovereignty. Russia simply
wasn’t prepared for an unknown new administration’s potential shift to Europe. By contrast, the
relative Kazakhstan’s relative servile diplomatic position and strong efforts to show goodwill to
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Putin can be reasoned as ample reason for Putin to let the Kazakh compatriot population rest
without instigation or avoid aggression more generally. Kazakhstan’s executive has consistently
recognized the leadership of Putin in the region, while Ukraine’s shifts in political climate make
the inter-presidential dynamics unpredictable at best.
Conclusion
In the instance of Ukraine, we have seen a diaspora population motivated into civil
conflict as a result of kin-state interference and used as justification for further aggression. This
population forms a significant bordering population of compatriots and therefore makes for
easily espoused irredentist claims. This population of both ethnic Russians and Russophone
peoples more broadly have been the focus of Russia’s foreign policy for almost a decade now.
By contrast, Kazakhstan has a similarly large population of Russians who make up the regions
bordering their titular homeland yet has not been motivated into acts of armed conflict or
significant civil disruption.
As illustrated by the outlined factors, we can see that the two states are vastly different in
a number of key areas that would motivate Moscow to engage its near-abroad Russians or not.
This leads us to believe that the irredentist, nationalist, and somewhat patronizing rhetoric
proclaimed by the Kremlin and the Putin regime is not rooted in substantial desire for reunifying
the Russian people. Rather, these compatriots are utilized as an extension of the kin-state’s
foreign policy only when it serves a realist function, such as forming a piece of defense against
perceived adversaries abroad, and the host-state maintains certain policies or behaviors that
appease Russia, such as loyalty to the Kremlin and a certain degree of status afforded to Russian
language or culture. These fundamental principles might be utilized to analyze similar near
abroad diasporas around the world and the likelihood of kin group engagement based on these
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factors. In addition to nationalist rhetoric, these kin states seek to assert hegemony in their region
when they see their interests threatened and their diaspora serves as a conduit for this desire. In
the case of Russia, their weaponizing of their compatriots has escalated to the point of invasion
and full-scale conventional warfare. This illustrates the extent to which a near-abroad diaspora
may be utilized to assert larger goals regional hegemony.
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